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This paper presents evidence about the impact on 
school enrollment of a program in Ecuador that gives 
cash transfers to the 40 percent poorest families. The 
evaluation design consists of a randomized experiment for 
families around the first quintile of the poverty index and 
of a regression discontinuity design for families around 
the second quintile of this index, which is the program’s 
eligibility threshold. This allows us to compare results 
This paper—a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to evaluate the impact of social programs. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at nschady@worldbank.org.  
from two different credible identification methods, and 
to investigate whether the impact varies with families’ 
poverty level. Around the first quintile of the poverty 
index the impact is positive while it is equal to zero 
around the second quintile. This suggests that for the 
poorest families the program lifts a credit constraint while 
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* We thank Arjun Bedi, Erik Plug and seminar participants in Madrid and Quito for their useful comments. 1. Introduction 
Many countries in Latin America provide poor families with conditional cash transfers. 
The first country that adopted such a program was Brazil in 1995. Other countries include Mexico 
(1997), Honduras (1998), Nicaragua (2000), Costa Rica, Colombia (2001), Argentina, Uruguay, 
Chile, and Jamaica.
1 Conditional cash transfer programs provide poor families with cash 
conditional on their children attending school and/or visiting health care centers. The 
attractiveness of such programs is the potential to combine short-term and long-term poverty 
reduction. The cash transfers reduce short-term poverty, while long-term poverty will be reduced 
if children of poor families acquire human capital. 
  The effectiveness of some of these programs has been assessed through rigorous impact 
evaluation studies. These studies show substantial positive effects of conditional cash transfers on 
school enrollment. The programs in Mexico and Nicaragua have been evaluated using 
randomized field experiments. In Mexico enrollment rates at the secondary school level increased 
from 67% to around 75% for girls and from 73% to around 78% for boys (Schultz 2004). In 
Nicaragua the program was targeted to pupils up to fourth grade in primary school. The program 
increased the enrollment rate for this group by 18 percentage points (Maluccio and Flores 2004).
2  
Other programs have been evaluated using non-experimental research designs. Duryea 
and Morrison (2004) used propensity score matching to evaluate the program in Costa Rica, and 
find a 5 to 9 percentage points increase in the probability of attending school. Attanasio et al. 
(2006) have evaluated the program in Colombia using propensity score matching in a difference-
in-differences framework. They find an increase in school enrollment of 5 to 7 percentage points 
for 14 to 17 year-olds.  
In this paper we evaluate the impact of a cash transfer to the poorest 40 percent families 
on school enrollment in Ecuador. While the program aims at increasing school attendance and 
visits to health care centers, the program does not impose any explicit requirement for children of 
treated families to attend school or visit health centers. An important consideration for the 
Ecuadorian government not to impose such requirements is that the administrative burden of 
monitoring attendance is high. Moreover, this requires careful consideration of incentive 
problems in the education system: interviews with teachers indicated that if they would be 
responsible for administering attendance, they might be inclined to report children to be present 
while they were actually not in school. A similar concern motivated Duflo and Hanna (2006) to 
                                                 
1 Rawlings and Rubio (2003), Caldés et al. (2004), and World Bank (2008) provide overviews of the 
various programs. 
2 The program in Honduras will also be evaluated through a randomized field experiment. Results are not 
yet available. 
  1use cameras with a tamper-proof date and time function, to monitor teacher attendance in India 
when teachers were provided financial incentives for attendance.  
While the formal rules of the program make it an unconditional program, this appears not 
to be the case in the perception of a substantial part of the potential beneficiaries. Before the 
actual implementation of the program there was a publicity campaign, which mentioned the need 
for households to enroll their children in school and take them to health care centers. Some 
surveys indicate that 1/3 of the beneficiaries state that they believe that the transfers are 
conditional, so that they will probably respond to the program as if it poses explicit requirements 
with regard to school enrollment and visits to health care centers.  
  An interesting feature of the design of the program’s impact evaluation is that it consists 
of a randomized experiment and of a regression discontinuity design. In the experiment 1309 
families around the first quintile of the poverty index were randomly assigned to treatment and 
control groups. For the regression discontinuity design data were collected from 1221 families 
around the second quintile of the poverty index, which is the program’s threshold for eligibility. 
Hence our estimates pertain to groups at two different locations of the poverty distribution, 
thereby giving insight into the potential heterogeneity of the program’s impact. If the cash 
transfer lifts a credit constraint, it is likely that the impact is larger among poorer families. 
Moreover, since school enrollment prior to the program’s implementation is lower among poorer 
families there is also more scope for an increase in enrollment among these families. 
Our empirical findings show that there are indeed heterogeneous treatment effects 
according to this pattern. School enrollment of children in families around the first quintile 
increases by about 10 percentage points in response to the cash transfer, while school enrollment 
of children in families around the second quintile is unaffected by the program. Our findings 
suggest that the program’s effectiveness can be enhanced by lowering the poverty threshold for 
program eligibility, so that unresponsive families are no longer covered (i.e. do not receive a 
windfall).  
  The experimental design using data from families around the first quintile has been 
analyzed before in a recent paper by Schady and Araujo (2008). Although their empirical 
approach differs somewhat from the approach adopted in this paper, the findings are qualitatively 
similar; they too find that school enrollment goes up by about 10 percentage points for families 
around the first quintile that receive the cash transfer. The main novelty of the current paper is 
that we present the findings from the randomized experiment along with the fresh evidence from 
the regression discontinuity design, and that we compare and interpret the findings from both 
designs. 
  2The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
program in Ecuador in more detail and provides information about the specific context.  Section 3 
describes the empirical approaches adopted in this paper. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 
presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Program and context 
Ecuador is a lower-middle income country, characterized by high poverty levels and high 
inequality. Between 1982 and 1990, enrollment increased from 68.6% to 88.9% for primary 
schools and from 29.5% to 43.1% for secondary schools. Despite an expansion of educational 
inputs in the 1990s, enrollment stagnated in that decade.  
  Compulsory schooling in Ecuador starts at the age of 5 and ends at the age of 14. This 
covers one year of pre-school, six years of primary school and three years of basic secondary 
school. Direct costs of schooling for parents include the following items: (i) uniforms; (ii) a (not 
so) voluntary contribution of around US$ 20 per year; (iii) school books; and (iv) transportation 
costs.
3 
The cash transfer program we evaluate in this paper is called the Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (BDH), and was launched in 2003.
4 It consists of a payment to the poorest 40 percent of 
families with children. The transfer equals US$ 15 per family per month and is independent of the 
number of children. The amount of US$ 15 should be compared to average monthly expenditures 
in the target group of around US$ 100. Whether a family belongs to the 40 percent poorest 
families depends on their score on a poverty index. The poverty index is computed using non-
linear principal components analysis based on 27 variables including household assets and 
housing characteristics (television, car, telephone, electricity, water, etc.), characteristics of head 
of household and her/his partner (schooling, ethnicity, illiteracy, labor market status, etc.), 
children’s characteristics and household size.   
The main stated objective of the program is to improve the formation of human capital 
among poor families in Ecuador. The program has two components: education and health. The 
education component aims at children from the ages of 6 to 15 to enroll in school and attend at 
least 90% of the school days. The health component aims at children under 6 years old to attend 
health centers for medical check-ups. Unlike other programs in Latin America, up until 2006 the 
program had no mechanisms to verify attendance in school and in health care centers. Families 
                                                 
3 The new government that started in 2007 eliminated the “voluntary” contribution and plans to provide 
free books and uniforms to children from poor families. 
4 The program incorporated two previous smaller programs aimed at the very bottom of the poverty 
distribution. See Vos et al (2001) and León and Younger (2004) for evaluations of one of these programs.  
  3are not taken off program rosters if their school-aged children are not enrolled in school or fail to 
attend classes regularly.  
 
3. Empirical approach 
To evaluate the impact of the Ecuadorian cash transfer program, we take advantage of 
two elements included in the design of the program during its initial stage: a randomized social 
experiment of families around the first quintile of the poverty index (EXP) and a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) created by the program’s eligibility threshold around the second 
quintile of the poverty index.
5 This will in principle produce credible estimates of the impact of 
the cash transfer at different points of the poverty distribution. The identifying assumption for the 
experimental design is that assignment to treatment and control groups is random. This 
assumption can be verified by comparing the two groups in terms of their observable 
characteristics. The identifying assumption for the regression discontinuity design is that 
conditional on a flexible function of the poverty index and other observables, eligibility for 
treatment is random for families with a poverty index close to the second quintile.  
More formally, we will estimate different versions of the following equation:  
  t i t i t i t i t i u P f X T Y , 1 , 1 , , , ) ( + + + = − − β δ       ( 1 )  
Where Y is school enrollment which takes a value of 1 if a child is enrolled and 0 otherwise, T is 
an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the person receives the treatment and 0 otherwise, X 
is a vector of individual, household and community level characteristics, f(P) is a flexible 
function (a third degree polynomial) of the poverty index, and u the error term. Subscript i 
indicates the child, t indicates the time period when the follow-up survey was conducted, t-1 
refers to the baseline period. For all the results we report heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
that are clustered at the family level.
6 
  The effect of interest is δ. When assignment in the experiment is truly random, 
controlling for observables should not affect the estimates.  In the regression discontinuity design, 
controlling for a flexible function of the underlying variable (poverty index) can be vital, 
depending on the (local) relationship between this variable and the outcome of interest. 
                                                 
5 When implementing the cash transfer program, the government of Ecuador planned to evaluate the 
program’s impact only through a regression discontinuity design. The initial design of the program 
established two different amounts: US$ 15 for families in the lowest quintile and US$ 11.5 for those in the 
second quintile. Once the research was designed and the baseline survey was conducted, the government, 
however, decided to grant all families in the bottom two quintiles US$ 15. The regression discontinuity 
around the first quintile was replaced by the randomized experiment.  
6 Clustering at the parish level instead of family level does not change our findings. 
  4It turns out that not all families that received the transfer were eligible, and vice versa. In 
the experiment some families that were assigned to control did receive the transfer and some 
families that were assigned to treatment did not receive it. Likewise, in the regression 
discontinuity design some families that should not have received the transfer did get it, while 
some other families that were eligible for the transfer did not receive it. There is thus not a 
deterministic relation between eligibility (assignment to treatment, poverty index) and actual 
receipt of treatment, but a probabilistic one. To address the potential biases caused by this 
contamination, we apply an instrumental variables approach where actual receipt of the cash 
transfer is instrumented by eligibility. This means that we will estimate a first stage equation in 
which the endogenous variable T in equation (1) is instrumented by the dummy variable for 
eligibility (Z), which takes the value 1 if the respondent is eligible for treatment (assignment to 
treatment or poverty index below the cutoff) and 0 otherwise. The identifying assumption is then 
that  .  0 ) , | ( 1 , 1 , , , = ⋅ − − t i t i t i t i P X u Z E
Since we have pre-intervention and post-intervention measures of outcomes at our 
disposal, we can also combine the experimental and regression discontinuity designs with a 
before-after approach. To this end we estimate equations of the following form: 
  t i t i t i t i t i u P f X T Y , 1 , 1 , , , ) ( Δ + + + = Δ − Δ Δ − Δ β δ      (2) 
Where ΔY is the change in school enrollment which takes a value of 1 if a child is enrolled at t 
and not enrolled at t-1, of 0 if the enrollment status is the same at t and t-1, and of –1 if a child is 
enrolled at t-1 but not at t. Specification (2) allows changes of Y to be affected by X and f(P). 
In addition to equations (1) and (2) we will also present results from reduced form 
estimations. These equations have a similar specification as equations (1) and (2), except that T is 





The experiment and the RD design were both implemented in four out of twenty-two 
provinces in the country.
8 The sampling scheme used a two-stage procedure. Within the 
provinces, parishes were randomly drawn and, within these parishes, a random sample of 
households was taken. The sampling scheme for both designs selected only households who had 
                                                 
7 Note that the ITT for the two designs has an entirely different interpretation. We come back to that after 
presenting the empirical findings 
8 These provinces are Carchi, Imbabura, Cotopaxi and Tungurahua, which are all located in the Sierra 
(highlands) region. 
  5at least one child aged 6 to 15 at the time of the baseline survey. A baseline survey was conducted 
between June and August 2003 and a follow-up survey was carried out between January and 
March 2005.   
  The sample for the experiment consists of households with a poverty index between the 
13th percentile and the 28th percentile. One-half of the households in this sample were randomly 
assigned to the treatment group that was eligible for the cash transfer, and the other half was 
assigned to the control group that was not eligible for the transfers during the period of the 
evaluation. These two groups are the lottery winners and the lottery losers respectively.  
To exploit the discontinuity in eligibility around the program’s eligibility threshold of the 
second quintile of the poverty index, families with a poverty index between the 33rd percentile 
and the 47th percentile were sampled. In that design families with their value of the poverty index 
between the 33rd percentile and the threshold (40
th percentile) are just eligible for receipt of the 
cash transfer. Families with a value on the poverty index between the threshold and the 47th 
percentile are just ineligible for receipt of the transfer.  
The survey includes one record for each household member including their gender, age 
and relation with the head of the household. The survey also contains information on parents’ 
level of schooling, marital status, and language spoken by all household members. For children 
aged between 5 to 17 years, the survey includes information on enrollment during the current 
school year (level and grade). Finally, the survey includes a complete module of household 
expenditures, which replicates the structure of the 1999 Ecuador LSMS.  
Attrition is low; 96% of the households interviewed at the baseline were interviewed 
again in the follow-up survey. No significant differences are found between households who were 
and were not interviewed. Attrition can introduce biases when correlated with treatment status 
(Angrist, 1997). A regression of an attrition indicator on treatment status has a coefficient of 
0.0012 (s.e. 0.11), suggesting that attrition will not bias our results. 
The sample is restricted to children aged 5 to 17 years when they live in households that 
responded to the follow-up survey. This results in a sample of 3,004 children in 1,309 families in 
the experiment, and of 2,384 children in 1,221 households in the RDD study.
9 Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics for eligible and ineligible children/households in both groups. Columns 1-3 
pertain to the RDD sample of children/households who have a poverty index just below or just 
above the program’s threshold. Columns 4-6 are for the experimental sample around the first 
quintile of the poverty index. 
                                                 
9 Data on all key variables are available for all households in the sample, with the exception of parental 
education, which is missing in some cases. 
  6  Some of the variables listed in table 1 serve as an input in the construction of the poverty 
index or are highly correlated with the poverty index. This is the case for head of household being 
indigenous, log of per capita expenditures and parents’ education. It is therefore not surprising 
that we find significant differences for these variables between the groups just below and above 
the cutoff in the RDD. This suggests that treatment and control groups in this design may be too 
different to compare. Recall, however, that the identifying assumption of the RDD is that there 
are no systematic differences between treatment and control groups conditional on covariates 
(including a flexible function of the poverty index). Hence, differences in observed characteristics 
do not invalidate the RDD.  
  With the genuine random assignment in the experimental study, we expect no significant 
differences for any of the observables in table 1. This is true for all variables in table 1, with two 
exceptions. Somewhat surprisingly, we find a significant difference between the two groups on 
the poverty index. The absolute difference between the eligible and non-eligible groups is, 
however, rather small. We believe that controlling for a flexible function of the poverty index will 
undo any biases due the apparent deviations from the randomized assignment. (And as our results 
in the next section show, our impact estimates are very similar whether we control for the poverty 
index or not.) Furthermore the randomization favored a bit families living in rural areas, as they 
were more likely to win the lottery. Here too, we believe that controlling for the urban area 
dummy in combination with canton fixed effects will eliminate any biases related to this 
composition difference. And again this is supported by the fact that the estimation results are not 
sensitive to the inclusion of these control variables. 
  The results in table 1 also show substantial differences between the RDD sample and the 
EXP sample. For most variables these differences reflect the differences between families around 
the first and around the second quintile of the poverty index, and hence these differences are 
qualitatively similar to the differences between the eligible and non-eligible groups in the RDD. 
Noticeable is the substantial difference in enrollment rates at baseline. This is close to 0.75 
around the first quintile and close to 0.85 around the second quintile. Our impact estimates should 
be regarded relative to these current enrollment rates, since there are obvious ceiling effects. 
Many countries in Latin America have very similar enrollment rates, including Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Honduras.  
 
  75. Results 
First stage 
The first thing that we need to establish is the (first stage) effect of eligibility of the cash 
transfer on actual receipt (treatment) of it. Among the winners of the experiment’s lottery, 529 of 
677 households (78%) received cash transfers. Among the losers of the lottery, 264 out of 632 
households (42%) erroneously received transfers. Likewise, out of a total of 537 families that 
were just above the second quintile of the poverty index in the RDD, 41 (8%) received the cash 
transfer. And out of 684 families that were eligible in the RDD because their poverty index was 
just below the second quintile, 178 (26%) did not receive the cash transfer. Hence for 31% of the 
families in the experiment and for 18% of the families in the RDD, eligibility-status and 
treatment-status do not coincide. 
Figure 1 plots the relation between the poverty index and the probability of actual 
treatment for the treatment and control groups in both designs (EXP and RDD) separately. At the 
right hand side of the figure the discontinuity in the probability of treatment around the cutoff in 
the RDD sample is evident. Closely around the second quintile of the poverty index, the 
probability of treatment drops by around 60 percentage points. Notice further that the relation 
between actual receipt and the poverty index is almost flat at both sides of the cutoff. This 
indicates that in this sample the probability of treatment is independent of the poverty index 
conditional on the eligibility status. The left hand part of the figure shows the same relations for 
the winners and losers in the experiment. Winners are clearly more likely to actually receive 
treatment than losers, but it is clear that a substantial fraction of the losers also receive treatment. 
Moreover, the two lines at the left hand part of the figure indicate that the difference in the 
probability of actual treatment between winners and losers increases with the poverty index. This 
shows that in the EXP-sample the probability of actual treatment is higher for poorer families. 
Table 2 shows these findings more formally for various specifications of the first stage 
relationship for the two samples. The top panel contains the results for the RDD sample. Column 
(1) contains no control variables, column (2) adds controls for background characteristics (see 
table 1), and column (3) adds a third degree polynomial of the poverty index.
10 Even in this latter 
specification, the coefficient of eligibility status is not lower than 0.64, and is always very 
significantly different from zero. The F-value for the instrument is never below 148. The flatness 
of the relation between treatment and poverty index at both sides of the cutoff is expressed by the 
low F-value for a joint test on the significance of the three poverty index terms. We cannot reject 
the hypothesis that conditional on other variables, the joint effect of these three terms equals zero.  
                                                 
10 Results are the same when we include the poverty index in linear or quadratic form. 
  8The bottom panel of table 2 reports results for the same first stage specifications for the 
EXP-sample. For this sample the point estimates are about half the size of those for the RDD-
sample. Nevertheless the first stage results are still very significant, and while inclusion of the 
poverty index terms cannot be rejected, the effect of eligibility of treatment is hardly affected by 
it.  
Administrative problems appear to have been the main cause for the high non-compliance 
to the assigned treatment status in the experiment. The persons responsible for the actual payment 
of the cash transfer to winners (and not to losers) initially did not respect the lists of winners and 
losers that were sent to them. Only after some time did they take it seriously. This suggests an 
important practical lesson for conducting randomized social experiments with the involvement of 
local civil servants/bureaucrats. The higher rate of compliance to eligibility status in the RDD 
suggests that in some circumstances, this might be a more effective evaluation scheme than a 
randomized experiment.  
 
Reduced form 
The first three columns in table 3 show the reduced form results for the EXP-sample. We 
present results for different specifications corresponding to those in the previous table. The top 
panel reports results for the levels specification, while the bottom panel reports results from 
specification in which the dependent variable is measured in first differences. In the level 
specifications the point estimates are close to 0.03 and in the first difference specifications they 
are slightly above 0.04. With one exception these estimates are significantly different from zero.  
  Going from the first to the third column we observe that adding more control variables 
does not change the estimates, as it should not given randomized assignment. Not much precision 
is gained by including extensive sets of control variables. For the results in the third column we 
tested for the joint significance of the poverty index polynomial.
11 We reject that the joint effects 
of these three terms equal zero.  
The last three columns of table 3 report the reduced form results for the RDD-sample. In 
all specifications the estimates are small and never significantly different from zero. Going from 
the fourth to the sixth column we observe that adding more controls makes the point estimate less 
negative or more positive. Differences between the point estimates in the different columns are, 
however, insignificant. For the results in the final column we tested for the joint significance of 
the poverty index polynomial.
12 We cannot reject that the joint effects of these three terms equal 
                                                 
11 Again results are the same when we include the poverty index in linear or quadratic form. 
12 Again results are the same when we include the poverty index in linear or quadratic form. 
  9zero. On the basis of efficiency considerations, we should therefore prefer the results in column 
(5). The standard error on the impact estimate in that column is substantially smaller than the 
standard error on the impact estimate in the final column. Based on our preferred first difference 
specification in the second column, we can rule out a program impact on school enrollment 
exceeding 2.7 percentage points for children in families around the second quintile of the poverty 
index, with 95% likelihood.  
Figure 2 illustrates the reduced form results for the specification without any controls 
using data for both samples. The right hand part clearly shows the absence of any impact in the 
RDD sample. In anything, it even seems that at the cutoff, eligibility for treatment has a slight 
negative impact. The left hand side shows the relation between the poverty index and school 
enrollment for winners and losers of the lottery. Evidently, children of families that won the 




Table 4 reports the IV results for the two samples. Point estimates are equal to the 
reduced form estimates (in table 3) divided by the first stage coefficient in the corresponding 
column (in table 2). The impact estimates for the EXP-sample are around 0.09 for the levels 
specification and around 0.12 for the first difference specification (columns 1-3). This implies 
that actual receipt of the cash transfer raises school enrollment by 9 to 12 percentage points for 
children in families around the first quintile of the poverty index. None of the impact estimates 
for the RDD-sample are significantly different from zero, implying that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that receipt of the cash transfer has no impact on school enrollment for children in 
families around the second quintile of the poverty index (columns 4-6).  
  These IV-estimates make very prominent the difference in impact the cash transfer has 
for families at different points of the poverty index. Average monthly expenditures amount to 
US$ 104 for families around the first quintile and US$ 125 for families around the second 
quintile. For the first group the extra US$ 15 per month has an impact and school enrollment goes 
up from around 75% to around 85%. For the second group the extra US$ 15 has no impact and 
school enrollment remains around 85%. Apparently, extra financial resources are helpful to 
increase school enrollment from 75% to 85%. To increase school enrollment beyond that level, 
extra cash appears not to matter. 
                                                 
13 From the figure it appears that the impact of winning in this group is larger for those with a high value of 
the poverty index. This is, however, a result of the lowess estimation being sensitive for outliers located at 
the ends of the graph. 
  10 
Comparing the EXP and RDD results 
Thus far we have presented and discussed the results from the experiment and the RDD 
as if they are entirely comparable. Assuming that the RDD approximates the conditions of 
randomized assignment, the results from the two designs would be comparable if there would be 
full compliance. That is: if intended treatment (eligibility) and actual treatment coincide. This is, 
however, not the case. In this subsection we discuss how this might affect the interpretation and 
comparability of the results from the two designs. 
  The ITT estimates are based on a comparison of the outcomes for children from eligible 
and ineligible families. In the RDD 82% of the sample received the treatment they were intended 
to receive, while this percentage is only 69% in the experiment. If the compliance rate in the EXP 
would be as high as in the RDD and if treatment has a non-negative effect on school enrollment, 
then the ITT estimates of the EXP would be higher than those reported in table 3. Consequently, 
due to the different compliance rates the difference in ITT estimates of the two designs is 
underestimated.  
Notice that the policy relevance of the ITT’s of the two designs is different. In the RDD it 
is really the intention not to provide cash transfers to families above the second quintile. In the 
EXP it is not be the intention of the policy makers to permanently withhold treatment from 
families that have been assigned to the control group.  
   Of greater policy relevance for the experimental design are the IV-estimates. The IV-
estimates divide the ITT-estimates by the difference in the probabilities of actual receipt of the 
cash transfer between eligible and ineligible observations. This estimator is usually interpreted as 
the local average treatment effect (LATE): it is the treatment effect measured on the compliers. 
Compliers are those (unidentifiable) observations that receive the cash transfer because they won 
the lottery (in the EXP) or because they are just below the eligibility threshold (in the RDD). Due 
to the different compliance rates and the (probably) different reasons for compliance in the two 
designs, it is difficult to compare the LATE-estimates across designs.  
Are the groups that deviated from their assigned eligibility status systematically different 
across the two samples? To gain some insight in this, table 5 reports the results of regression of 
actual treatment status on background characteristics, separately for the EXP and RDD-samples 
and for the eligible and ineligible groups within these samples. The first column in this table 
pertains to observations in the EXP that lost the lottery. The probability that a person in that 
ineligible group receives treatment decreases with the poverty index (poorer people are more 
likely to receive treatment) and increases when the mother lives in the same house. The second 
  11column shows that the probability that lottery winners in the EXP actually receive treatment is 
higher when children were enrolled in school at baseline and is also higher in rural areas than in 
urban areas. A higher compliance rate in the EXP would relocate some families from the (Z=0, 
T=1) group to the (Z=0, T=0) group thereby lowering the poverty level in the latter group. At the 
same time it would relocate some families from the (Z=1, T=0)-group to the (Z=1, T=1) group, 
thereby increasing the share of children with lower enrollment levels at baseline in the latter 
group. If poverty and low enrollment at baseline are both negatively correlated with lower 
enrollment rates, then the enrollment levels of both the treated and the control groups are upward 
biased.
14 But since the low compliance rate is mainly due to the high take-up are of transfers 
among ineligible families, and higher compliance rate in the EXP-design would probably lead to 
a larger relocation in this group, and thereby to a larger impact estimate of the program. 
Columns 3 and 4 repeat this for the eligible and ineligible groups in the RDD. Families 
just below the threshold are more likely to actually receive the cash when the mother lives in the 
house (this is expectable since the money is provided to the mother). Moreover, in both groups 
(eligible and ineligible) living in an urban area significantly reduces the chances of collecting the 
cash. It is not clear a priori whether, and if so in which direction, these composition effects would 
bias the RDD-estimates. 
 
6. Summary and discussion 
This paper evaluates the impact on school enrollment from a program in Ecuador that gives 
cash transfers to the 40 percent poorest families. Using data from a randomized experiment and 
from a regression discontinuity design, we find heterogeneous effects of the program on school 
enrollment. Around the first quintile of the poverty index the cash transfer of US$ 15 per month 
increases school enrollment from 75% to 85%. Around the second quintile the cash transfer has 
no impact and school enrollment remains 85%. This suggests that for the poorest families in 
Ecuador the program lifts a credit constraint while this is not the case for families close to the 
eligibility threshold. 
Increasing school enrollment is one of the main goals of the cash transfer program in 
Ecuador. Our findings suggest two different avenues to enhance the program’s effectiveness. 
Because children in families close to the program’s eligibility cutoff are not affected by the 
                                                 
14 Put differently, the poorest households were likely to receive transfers no matter whether they lost or won 
the lottery.  These households are therefore unlikely to be compliers in the language of Angrist, Imbens and 
Rubin (1996).  A similar argument holds for households whose children were enrolled at baseline—they 
were more likely to receive transfers than those households whose children were not enrolled at baseline, 
no matter what their lottery status. 
  12program, it might be considered to lower the threshold. Our results are however not more 
informative about the optimum threshold level other than that it should be somewhere between 
the first and second quintile of the poverty index.  Alternatively, it might be considered to impose 
an explicit requirement for children to be enrolled in school to qualify for the transfer. 
  Recently the Ecuadorian government decided to double the amount of the cash transfers 
from US$ 15 to US$ 30. Given the findings reported in this paper, it is doubtful whether this 
increase will have an impact on school enrollment.
15 It will not have an impact for children in 
families close to the program’s threshold. These families are already unresponsive to receipt of 
the first US$ 15, so the next US$ 15 will only have a smaller impact. But also children in families 
around the first quintile are unlikely to respond to the increase in the transfer. The first US$ 15 
already made their enrollment levels catch-up with that of children from families around the 
second quintile of the poverty index. The results for the children from families around the second 
quintile suggest that something different than cash is needed to boost the enrollment rate above 
0.85. 
 
                                                 
15 For a discussion of the likely impacts on health and cognitive development outcomes, see Paxson and 
Schady (2008). 
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  15Figure 1: First stage relation 
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  16Table 1: Descriptive statistics by sample and eligibility status 















0.85 0.86  0.625  0.75 0.77  0.426 
Child’s age  11.9  12.0  0.498  11.4  11.4  0.592 
Child is female  0.53  0.52  0.787  0.49  0.51  0.187 
Log of per capita 
expenditures 
2.92 3.07  0.000  2.69 2.72  0.259 
Poverty index  49.4  51.9  0.000  43.0  42.8  0.001 
Father’s education  5.68  6.16  0.000  4.76  4.65  0.281 
Mother’s education  5.28  5.92  0.000  3.84  3.75  0.381 
Father lives at home  0.79  0.77  0.209  0.83  0.82  0.864 
Mother lives at 
home 
0.90 0.85  0.000  0.93 0.94  0.251 
Head of household 
is male 
0.85 0.87  0.307  0.88 0.87  0.218 
Head of household 
is indigenous 
0.09 0.06  0.002  0.17 0.17  0.024 
Head of household 
can read and write 
0.94 0.96  0.161  0.84 0.88  0.006 
  17Household size  5.63  5.58  0.422  6.36  6.28  0.255 
Urban area  0.51  0.51  0.992  0.47  0.53  0.001 
Number of children  1394  990    1567  1437   
  18Table 2: First stage results 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3) 
  RDD 
Eligibility status  0.694*** 0.681*** 0.648*** 
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.053) 
F-value for instrument  1030***  956***  149*** 
F-value for poverty index terms     0.06 
 EXP 
Eligibility status  0.347*** 0.358*** 0.362*** 
 (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
F-value for instrument  155***  175***  183*** 
F-value poverty index terms      2.42* 
Controls None  X  X,  f(P) 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust and 
clustered at family level. ***/* indicates significance at the 1%/10% 
level. Number of observations equals 2384/3004 for RDD/EXP 
sample. X includes: dummies for child’s age, dummy for child’s 
gender, dummies for (potential) grade levels, consumption, parents’ 
education, dummies for parents being present, dummy for gender of 
head of household, dummy for ethnicity of head of household, 
dummy for head of household being illiterate, household, size, 
dummy for urban/rural area, canton dummies. 
  19Table 3: Reduced form results 
   EXP      RDD   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Levels 
Eligibility status  0.029  0.033** 0.031** -0.009  0.002  0.013 
 (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.035) 
F-value poverty index 
terms 
   4.16**      0.06 
  First Differences 
Eligibility status  0.042***  0.044*** 0.044*** -0.002 -0.003 0.026 
 (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.034) 
F-value poverty index 
terms 
   2.42*      1.12 
Controls  None  X  X, f(P)  None  X  X, f(P) 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at family level. 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Number of observations equals 3004 in 
EXP and 2384 in RDD . See also the note of table 2. 
 
 
  20Table 4: IV results 
   EXP      RDD   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Levels 
Eligibility status  0.084  0.092** 0.086** -0.013  0.003  0.019 
 (0.054)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.056) 
F-value poverty index 
terms 
   4.67***      0.06 
  First Differences 
Eligibility status  0.120***  0.124*** 0.120*** -0.003 -0.004 0.042 
 (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.055) 
F-value poverty index 
terms 
   2.63*      0.95 
Controls  None  X  X, f(P)  None  X  X, f(P) 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at family level. 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Number of observations equals 3004 in 






  21Table 5: Determinants of actual treatment by sample and eligibility status 
      EXP  RDD 
Variable  Ineligible Eligible Ineligible Eligible 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
School enrollment pre intervention  -0.036  0.075*  -0.051  -0.006 
  0.046 0.040 0.037 0.046 
Poverty  index  -0.035**  -0.015 0.003 -0.021 
  0.015 0.011 0.016 0.022 
Child is female  0.011  0.002  -0.024  0.005 
  0.024 0.019 0.015 0.023 
Father’s education  0.017  0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  0.010 0.009 0.005 0.007 
Mother’s  education  0.007 0.004 -0.004 0.007 
  0.009 0.007 0.005 0.006 
Father lives at home  0.013  -0.056  -0.033  0.161 
  0.097 0.070 0.043 0.094 
Mother lives at home  0.172**  0.135  0.021  0.141** 
  22  23
  0.085 0.084 0.035 0.080 
Head of household is male  0.056  -0.007  -0.011  -0.103 
  0.104 0.073 0.050 0.093 
Head of household is indigenous  0.071  -0.020  -0.062  -0.030 
  0.072 0.062 0.041 0.078 
Head of household can read and write  0.040  0.014  -0.029  0.130 
  0.072 0.061 0.075 0.084 
Household size  0.017  0.000  0.035***  0.012 
  0.013 0.011 0.012 0.011 
Urban  area  -0.061  -0.120** -0.068* -0.128** 
  0.061 0.048 0.040 0.051 
N  1437  1567 990 1394 
R  squared  0.177 0.115 0.178 0.111 
 Note: Standard errors in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at family level. 
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Number of observations equals 3004 in 
EXP and 2384 in RDD . See also the note of table 2. 
 
        
 
 